HOC BELLYING

19 June 1957

## UN REPORT ON SUNGARY

- I. The report of the UN Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary has been completed and approved without reservations by all numbers of the Committee (Amstralia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay). It will probably be submitted to regular session of the General Assembly this fall (an earlier special session appears unlikely).
  - A. The report strongly condense the USSE for its intervention, and brands as false the Soviet thesis that the oprising was fomented by reactionary circles in Hungary abetted by western "imperialists."
  - B. It concludes that the revolt was a speataneous national uprising due to long standing popular grievances one of which was the inferior status of Rangary with respect to the USSE.
- II. The report dites numerous examples of Soviet duplicity.
  - A. It absolves Premier Magy of any complicity in the initial intervention of Soviet forces and notes that the first Soviet tanks appeared in Budapost at 2 am on 26 October.
    - 1. The Seviet Government claims it intervened on the basis of a telegram received on 24 October from the Hungarian premier requesting Seviet assistance to quell the uprising.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. THE DECLASOIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS G C DEAT DEVISW DATE:

- 3. The report states: "It is indeed difficult for the committee to understand how Soviet tanks could arrive in Eudapest at 2 as 24 October in response to a request received by the Government of the USSR on the same day."
- B. The report also questions the validity of the Soviet clain that it reintervened in Mungary on 4 November on the invitation of the Kadar government.
  - The Committee states that it "is matisfied that no well-placed observer could conclude that the Wagy Government "was in any serious danger from counterrevolutionary forces."
  - 2. Report calls attention to the notable absence of the new Kadar Government at the time of the second intervention.
  - 3. Committee has evidence that Eadar who disappeared from Budapest after 2 November, was in Moscow on 4 November (his radio speech from Smelnek outside Budapest on that morning being a tape recording) in Prague on 5 and possibly 6 November, and not in Budapest until the morning of 7 November.
- C. The committee concludes: "The Soviet withdrawal during the last days of October was no more than a measure dictated by the desire of the Soviet army to be in a position to launch a more powerful intervention with the least possible delay."

- In this equaection the Committee has testimony that
  in the negetiations on 3 November between the Hungarian and the Soviet military officials for withdrawal
  of Soviet forces, discussions proceeded smoothly and
  amieably until almost midnight.
- 2. At that point the delegations were interrupted by
  the entrance of Seviet security chief General Serov
  and other officers who announced that they were
  arresting the Hungarian delegation.
- 3. General Malinin, head of Soviet delegation, visibly actonished, made a gesture of indignation. Serov whispered to him; Malinin then shrugged his shoulders and ordered his delegation to leave the room.
- III. Finally the committee notes that the Soviet action in Hungary "would probably be open to condemnation under the Soviet government's own definition of aggression."
  - A. Seviet proposal to UN in 1956 provided that the "attacks or indirect aggression may not be justified by the internal situation of any state, as for example...any revolutionary or counter-revolutionary sovement, civil war, disorders or strikes..."

## Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800080021-8

- IV. Other highlights:
- XIII. A. Report notes Soviet intervention to arrest Magy after Kadar paras 35-40 gov\*t had given Yugoslavs guarantee of his safety if he left asylum in Yugoslav Embassy.
- VI. B. Two witnesses said that on 25 Oct Gero asked Magy to sign para 49 an antedated document asking Soviet intervention and that Magy wrote on the paper "I do not accept this. I will not sign it."
- VII. C. "Committee knows of no Hungarian" who acted to repress

  para 26 insurrection following Soviet reintervention on 4 November.

  "If any Hungarians fought against the insurgents, they were only
  the few members of the dissolved AVH...."
- AV. D. Committee concludes that "deportations of Hungarian citizens
  para 28 to the USSR have taken place in considerable numbers, which cannot
  be accurately assessed, but which run into the thousands."
  No proof that more than part have been returned to Hungary.
- X. E. Report notes that on night of 23 Oct AVH "infuriated the para 36 demonstrators by use of Red Cross ambulances. Vehicles "contained AVH police waving doctors" white coats" and carried arms.
- II. F. "Many of the new Soviet troops brought into Hungary for the para 28 second intervention came from the distant regions of Central Asia. Many believed they were in Egypt, with the mission of fighting the Anglo-French "Imperialists".